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GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLEMENTATION IN 








Pelaksanaan Good Corporate Governance (GCG) telah menjadi topik menarik di 
Indonesia maupun di banyak negara lain. Studi saat ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui 
penerapan GCG dalam teknologi tertentu dan perusahaan telekomunikasi di Indonesia 
dan Malaysia. GCG pelaksanaan diukur dengan menggunakan variabel sebagai berikut 
aksi korporasi, unsur GCG dalam struktur organisasi, kepemilikan publik, laporan 
keuangan yang diaudit, dan pengembalian jumlah aset. Data teknologi dan perusahaan 
telecommuncation di Indonesia dan Malaysia dari tahun 2005 sampai 2007are 
diperoleh dari database OSIRIS. Regresi digunakan dalam analisis data. Penelitian ini 
datang dengan hasil sebagai berikut. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa faktor yang 
mempengaruhi laba bersih yang berbeda antara Indonesia dan Malaysia. Di Indonesia, 
kepemilikan publik dan tindakan perusahaan mempengaruhi laba bersih. Sementara 
itu, faktor yang mempengaruhi di Malaysia adalah aksi korporasi, kemandirian 
kepemilikan publik, kualitas laporan keuangan yang telah diaudit, dan pengembalian 
jumlah aset. Akhirnya, penelitian ini memberikan kontribusi dalam mengembangkan 
variabel struktur organisasi GCG. Untuk memberikan pemahaman tentang faktor yang 
mempengaruhi penerapan GCG di perusahaan teknologi dan komunikasi di Indonesia 
dan Malaysia. 
 
Kata kunci: Good Corporate Governance (GCG), Indonesia, Malaysia,  
          kelengkapan struktur organisasi GCG, indikator kemandirian 
          masyarakat, telekomunikasi dan perusahaan teknologi. 
 
BACKGROUND 
The economic turmoil hit ASEAN region in 1997-1999. The crisis which began in 
Thailand spread out to most countries in South East Asia and also other Asian countries. 
Many companies in these countries that did not implement good corporate governance were 
colapsed. Since then, countries in ASEAN region including Indonesia and Malaysia then 
require companies especialy in stock exchange to implement good corporate governance. 
Therefore, the GCG has been implemented in the stock exchange in South East Asia 
countries since 2000. 
The curent research aims to show implementation of good corporate governance in 
telecommunication and technology companies in Indonesia and Malaysia. The 
implementation of GCG principles is indicated by some variables: transparency of reported 
corporate action, the quality of financial report, public ownership, management performance, 
and GCG organisation structure. The research model is presented in Figure 1. Transparency 
of company action is included as the implementation of non-financial transparency aspect. 
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The GCG organisation structure is measured by the number of GCG members in company. 
Wedari (2004) states that the existence of GCG organisation structure is measured using audit 
commitee proxy, which is stated by ‘available’ or ‘not available’. A study by Herawaty 
(2008) suggests that the existence of independent commissioners is a proxy for organisation 
structure. Meanwhile, Nuryaman (2008) applies the proportion of independent commisioner 
to the total number of the company’s board of commisioner. Hence, our opinion, the proxy of 
GCG administration team is not only independent commisioner and/or audit commitee. Both 
are just parts of the GCG organisation structure. The complete GCG organisation structure 
consists of independent commisioner, remuneration commitee, audit commitee, legal 
commitee, compliance commitee, mitigation commitee, and corporate secretary. During the 
initial GCG implementation in 2001, Bapepam issued a guidance on the composition of GCG 
organisation board, which consists of minimum three components: independent commisioner, 
audit commitee, and corporate secretary. 
The ownership concentration is measured using indicator of the independency of 
public ownership provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. This is a new approach 
in the research of GCG in Indonesia, since the ownership concentration is usualy indicated 
by other proxy, for instance managerial or institutional ownership (Midiastuty & Machfoedz, 







Net profit is an instrument to measure the company’s operational performance. It 
measures the success or failure of a business in achieving target of its operation (Parawiyati, 
1996). Financial report is one of the signals from the company for external parties. Statement 
of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 1 (1978) stated that the main user of financial 
report are investors and creditors, and it indicates that the main focus of financial report is the 
information about the company’s profit. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 
No.1 (1978) also stated that the financial report should deliver useful information for the 
investors and creditors, both existing and potential ones, in deciding the policy of investment, 
credit, and other decisions. Investor and creditor use the profit to: (a) Evaluate the 
management performance. (b) Estimate the earning power. (c) Predict the future profit. (d) 
Assess the investment risk or the company’s loan (SFAC no.1). 
Creditors can use the net profit information to make a loan decision and to asses the 





Quality of Audited 
Financial Report 
Keuangan Auditan 
Return on Total Aset 
Total Number of GCG 
member in Organisation 
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exchanges (Bal dan Brown, 1968; Beaver dan Dukes, 1972; Sloan, 1996). Sloan (1996) 
evaluates the information content in terms of accrual and cash flow components. He tries to 
see whether or not the information is reflected in the stock price. Sloan (1996) also shows 
that the stock price wil react if the investor ‘fixate’ (believe) on the profit. Sloan’s research 
(1996) was consistent with the fixation of profit by some of stock market participant on the 
total reported profit without considering the size of accrual and cash flow components. 
Mispricing phenomenon which was shown in Sloan’s (1996) research indicates that there is a 
tendency of over-focussing on the reported profit in the stock exchange. 
Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) found that companies that show negative profit request 
their auditor to schedule the audit process quite late than the supposed schedule. This leads to 
delay of financial report. The research argues that a company wil tend to pospone its 
financial report if there is a ‘bad news’ in its report because it wil afect the profit quality. A 
company which shows good (high) profitability means ‘good news’ in its financial report. In 
turn, a company that show ‘good news’ tends to submit its financial report on time. The 
opposite occurs in the case of company that show ‘bad news’. 
Corporate action is the actions taken by a company which is announced to public. 
This is a reflection of a good administration and public transparency on the non-financial 
aspect. In this term, corporate action - both national and multi national company - wil also 
afect the stock price. Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (2008) states that a complete 
format of corporate action included al values: company meeting, listing status change, 
announcement, preferential ofer, bonus, new listing, buy back, issuer name change, 
preference conversion, local code change, arrangement, security description change, 
international code change, take over, etc. 
Total number of member of GCG organisation structure can be taken as the 
completeness of organisation structure as an implementation of GCG principal which was 
required by the regulator. This variable is chosen considering the possibilty of incomplete 
GCG organisation structure existence, for example merely director and commissioner. Some 
countries have similar requirements to be implemented in GCG. The requirements are 
independent commissioners, audit commitee, remuneration commitee, nomination 
commitee, compliance commitee, legal commitee, and risk commitee. In Indonesia, 
according to Bapepam guidelines in 2001, the completeness of GCG organisation structure 
consists of independent commissioners, audit commitee, and company secretary. 
Some studies show that there are effect of size and composition of board of director in 
company activities. The size and composition of board of director can afect the efectivity of 
monitoring activity. The size and composition of board of director also afect the relation 
between managerial ownership and institutional ownership on the company’s performance. 
According to Pfefer (1973) the increase in size and diversity of board of director wil benefit 
the company since it wil expand the network and guarantee the availability of resources. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that by including outside directors, the performance of 
the board wil improve and it can minimize the management expropriation to the 
shareholder’s welfare. In doing so, audit commitee facilitates a formal communication 
between the board, management, external and internal auditor (Bradbury et al., 2004). Audit 
commitee acts as the mediator when disputes occur between the management and auditors 
on the interpretation and implementation of generaly accepted accounting principles (Klien, 
2002). Anderson et al. (2003) investigated the relation between the characteristics of 
commissioners, financial report integrity, and the cost of debt. 
Problems of ownership concentration in Indonesian and Malaysia indicate the agency 
problem between the dominant and minority stock owners occurs because of the separation 
between the cash flow right and control right (Claessens et al., 2000). This is diferent with a 
study by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that separates ownership and control. Machfoedz 
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(2008) states that shareholder voice function indicates that commissioner is also responsible 
to increase the voice of owner (investors) to increase the company’s value. Claessens et 
al.(1999) defined the expropriation as a process which is used by the controling share holder 
to maximize their own wealth or redistribute the wealth from other parties through the 
controling power. Claessens et al. (1999, 2000) studied the expropriation of minority share 
holder in public companies in nine Asian countries by investigate impact of diferentiation of 
cash flow and control rights to the company’s value, and observing the ownership structure of 
companies. 
Pyramid ownership and cross ownership are two most common mechanism used by 
the controling shareholder to increase the control exceeds the financial claim to the 
company. The concentrated ownership may relate to low level of law enforcement (La Porta 
et al., 1998 dan 2000). The results of La Porta et al. (1998) study may be understated due to 
the use of direct ownership data, not the ultimate ownership. By adopting La Porta et al 
(1999) methodology, Claessens et al., (1999, 2000) studied the controling share holder 
which consist of individual, family or institution which have control in a company, both 
definite and indefinite, at the cut-of level of certain privileges. In regard to ownership 
concentration, Morck et al. (2004) argue that the majority share holders which efectively 
control the company wil also control the reported accounting information. La Porta et al. 
(2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) found that the ownership concentration in cash flow rights 
wil increase the company’s value. 
Public accountant is one of the most important parties to produce a qualified financial 
report for the stock exchange. Public accountant’s role is to provide assurance that financial 
report made by the management is free of material misstatement. The assurance is given by 
the public accountant through their opinion. According to PSA 29 SA article 508 in ‘Standard 
of Public Accountant Profession’ there are five categories of public accountant’s opinion: (1) 
unqualified opinion; (2) unqualified opinion with explanatory language; (3) qualified 
opinion; (4) adverse opinion; and (5) disclaimer opinion. Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) stated 
that lateness in financial report positively related with audit opinion. Companies receiving 
other than unqualified opinion tend to have longer audit delay or tend to give their financial 
report not in the expected time frame. On the other hand, companies that obtain unqualified 
opinion from the auditor tend to submit their financial report on time. 
Gleaned from the literatures above, the current research proposes research model as 
shown in Figure 1: 
Net Profit for each country = a + b1Public Ownership + b2 Number of GCG structure + b3 
Corporate Action + b4 Quality of Audited Financial Report + b5 Return of Total Assets + 
e 
Therefore, based on the research model, hypothesis for this research is formulated as 
folows: 
H1: Corporate Actions, public ownership, the number of GCG structure, quality of audited 
financial report, and return of total assets influence net profit in information and 
communication technology companies in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The data population is annual report of telecommunication and technology companies 
registered in the stock exchange in Indonesia and Malaysia for year of 2005, 2006, and 2007 
consecutively. Samples are selected using the folowing criterias: 
1). The companies are registered in stock exchange. 
2). Industry classification: communication and technology industry, based on Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
3). The closing of accounting period is 31 December. 
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Having applied above criterias, total of 230 samples were colected that consist of 38 
companies from Indonesia and 192 companies from Malaysia. 
 Dependent variable in the current study is net profit (logged). Independent variables 
are indicator of public ownership independency by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing, 
corporate action, quality of audited report, return on total asset, and total number of GCG 
organisation structure. These variables are then operationalized as: 
1). Net profit is the profit after the annual tax. 
2). Number of communication and technology companies is the total number of 
communication and technology companies in each country. 
3). Independency indicator by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). According 
to OSIRIS Data Guide (2003), BvDEP ownership indicators are: A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, 
C+, C, C-, D, and U. The highest level ‘11’ is equal to A+, while the lowest level ‘1’ is 
equal to ‘U’ (unknown). The indicator of independency is used to help the users in 
identifying independent companies by marking their degree of independency based on 
the shareholders. The ‘A’ indicator wil be company with non-registered owner less 
than 24,99%, both direct and total ownership. BvDEP classifies further the A level into 
A+, A, and A-. The ‘B’ indicator is given to company with percentage of registered 
ownership, both direct and total ownership, no more than 49,99%, but has one or more 
shareholders with more than 24,99% ownership. BvDEP also classified this grade into 
B+, B, and B-. The ‘C’ indicator is provided to company with registered ownership, 
either direct or total, more than 49,99%. The ‘C’ indicator indicates an ultimate 
ownership. The ‘U’ indicator is assigned to company which is not belong to A, B, or C, 
categories, which indicated an unknown degree of independency. 
4). Corporate action is activity conducted by the company and announced to public which 
can be regarded as company transparency and good administration from nonfinancial 
aspect. Corporate action that can be both national and international level may influence 
the share price. Corporate action is measured by the number of activities published or 
announced to public (ratio scale). 
5). Quality of audited report is level of opinion of audited financial report, where score 4 
for unqualified opinion, score 3 for unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph, 
score 2 for no opinion, and score 1 for unaudited. 
6). GCG organisation structure is the completeness of organisation structure as the 
implementation of GCG which is required by the regulator. Each country has similar 
requirement to be implemented in GCG for instance independent commissioners, audit 
commitee, remuneration commitee, compliance commitee, nomination commitee, 
legal commitee, and risk commitee. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Some tests are performed in this stage: normality, multicolinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorelation. To handle outlier data, missing value-exclude cases 
listwise program was performed using SPSS. Before testing the hypotheses, the data is firstly 
tested in terms of data model regresion feasibility, overal model fit, and regresion coeficient. 
The results show that no problem found from these tests. The results of regression analysis 
are presented in folowing sub sections: 
There are 192 communication and technology companies listed in Malaysia. 
However, only 130 companies satisfy al the GCG characteristics: the corporate actions, 
quality of audited report, ownership independency, return and total assets, and number of 
GCG organisation structure in three consecutive years (2005, 2006, and 2007). In terms of 
corporate action, the average value is 8.39. Ownership indicator score is 7.65. The value of 
‘7’ is equal to ‘B’, while the value of ‘8’ is equal to B+. The average score of audited report 
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quality is 3.92. It means that most of the communication and technology companies in 
Malaysia indicate good quality of audited report (unqualified opinion). In terms of number of 
GCG organisation structure, the average score for Malaysia is 4.92. It means that most of the 
communication and technology companies in Malaysia indicate good GCG structure. The 
average score of GCG structure for Malaysia is 4.92. The average log of net profit is 3.1916. 
Statistical test results show that value of Adjusted R Square is 0.530. It means that 
53% of net profit variable can be explained by the number of companies in the country, 
corporate action, the quality of audited report, ownership independency, return ot total assets, 
and number of GCG organisation structure. Result of ANOVA test shows that F score is 
30.094 with 0.000 significancy, which suggests these independent variables affect net profit. 
Summary of statistic results including the regression coeficient for Malaysia is presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Regression Results of Telecommunication and Technology Companies in Malaysia 
Variable Descriptive Statistics Model 
Summary 
ANOVA Coeficient 
Coef.Unstand.   





F Sig B Std.Er
ror 
t Sig 
Net Income 3.1916 0.8175 130 0.530 0.56048 30.094 0.000 3.421 0.638 5.359 0.000 
Corporate 
action 
8.39 5.802 130 0.078 0.009 8.411 0.000 
Financial 
Statement 
3.92 0.344 130 -0.496 0.148 -3.350 0.001 
Independenc
y 
7.65 3.366 130 0.000 0.015 0.025 0.980 
RoTA 11.603 8.493 130 0.048 0.006 8.051 0.000 
Stucture 
GCG 
4.92 5.802 130 0.103 0.053 1.955 0.053 
 
 
Results of regression analysis suggest that three out of five variables significantly 
influence net profit. Two variables - independency ownership and number of GCG 
organisation structure - do not afect net profit. The three factors that significantly afect net 
profit achievement consist of two positive variables and one negative variable. The positive 
factors are corporate actions and return of total assets. Meanwhile, the negative factor is 
quality of audited report. Return of total asset reflects total assets performance to obtain 
return. In Malaysia, return of total assets afects the net profit in telecommunication and 
technology companies. It means that investment on assets is an important and significant 
factor in the net profit achievement. 
The average score for corporate actions in Indonesia (2005-2007) is 16.71. The 
quality of audited financial report indicates an average of 3.88, with 0.612 standard of 
deviation. It means that almost al data are unqualified opinion. The value of public 
ownership variable in Indonesia is 3.13. The value of 3 is equivalent to C- and value of 4 is 
equivalent to C. The return of total assets in Indonesia is 6.6038. Interestingly, the number of 
organisation structure as part of GCG completeness shows an average of 1 with deviation 
standard is 0.00. This means that al the communications and technology companies in 
Indonesia merely own one GCG organisation structure. Summary of statistic results for 
Indonesia is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Regression Results of Telecommunication and Technology Companies in Indonesia 
 
Variable Descriptive Statistics Model ANOVA Coeficient 
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Summary Coef.Unstand.   
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
N Adj. R2 Stand 
Er of 
the est. 
F Sig B Std.Er
ror 
T Sig 
Net Income 3.558 1.343 24 0.706 0.7289 14.781 0.000 4.632 1.035 4.476 0.000 
Corporate 
action 
16.71 7.515 24 -0.059 0.025 -2.351 0.030 
Financial 
Statement 
3.88 0.612 24 -0.339 0.249 -1.360 0.190 
Independency 3.13 3.288 24 0.394 0.080 4.921 0.000 
RoTA 6.630
8 
7.555 24 -0.001 0.031 -0.043 0.966 
Stucture GCG 1 0.00 24 - - - - 
 
The regression analysis results show value of Adjusted R Square of 0.706. ANOVA 
test shows that F score is 14.781 with 0.000 level of significance. This shows that the model 
of regression using variables of corporate actions, ownership independency, quality of 
audited report, and return of total assets afect the net profit. Further, the study results show 
that in Indonesia, public ownership and corporate actions influence net profit in 
communication and technology companies. Unfortunately, the impact of quality of audited 
report and return of total assets on net profit are not significant. 
The study of GCG implementation in communication and technology companies in 
Indonesia and Malaysia countries shows mixed results. In Malaysia, regression analysis 
results show that corporate actions, return of total assets and quality of audited report 
significantly affect the achievement of net profit. Summary of analysis results for Indonesia 
and Malaysia is presented in Table 3 as folows: 
 
Table 3: 
Summary of Results 
Lokasi Corp 
Action 









Malaysia √ √ - √ - 
Indonesia √ - √ - -▓ 
√ = influence 
▓ = deleted (standar deviation value is 0.00) 
 
CONCLUSION 
In terms of number of GCG organisation structure, the average score for Malaysia is 
4.92. It means that most of the communication and technology companies in Malaysia 
indicate good GCG structure. The average score of GCG structure for Malaysia is 4.92, that 
is higher than Indonesia (1). In terms of Indonesia, GCG structure variable is excluded from 
the independent variables since its standard of deviation is 0.00. Therefore, structure of GCG 
in communication and technology industry sector in Indonesia needs to be improved. 
Further, In Indonesia, the regression analysis using four dependent variables suggest that 
public ownership and corporate actions variables significantly influence net profit 
achievement. 
Finaly, the curent research contributes in developing the GCG organisation structure 
variable, especialy in the context of communication and technology companies in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. The variable is more comprehensive proxy than the variable that are previously 
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developed, for instance, by Wedari (2004), Herawaty (2008), and Nuryaman (2008). In the 
curent study, GCG organisation structure consists of independent commissioners, 
renumeration commitee, audit commitee, legal commitee, compliance commitee, 
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